What two improbable things are usually related?

The cultural meaning of images pp 52-323 | Cite as

Part of the DUV: Social Science book series (DUVSW)


The question of “where the image seen is created” is not as old as image communication, but a few years ago some people said that images are created in the eye of the beholder. The discourse in art documents comparable difficulties in localizing how or from where images are seen and understood. This is demonstrated programmatically by the following text of a public poster:

"Viewing art is not a conceptual assessment of the artistic object (whether it is still art)

but the aesthetic self-experience of the viewing subject (how it unfolds and proportions its imagination). ”[Lingner 1986/72]

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  1. G.R. Koch pointedly pointed out a current development in the FAZ of September 28, 1992 regarding Documenta 9: "Anyone who wanted to experience art has to think a lot about it, in the end they themselves." Apparently art is primarily understood as the final interpretant in a character code in which art experience is rather distant strived for. As the artist Hya Kabakov [cf. 1993/22] thinks that the interest is no longer in the production of a work of art, but rather in the discourse that first creates the work of art.Google Scholar
  2. Without the abstraction of environmental events on a cognitive level, it is impossible to control meaningful action [cf. Roth 199 la / 247]. Google Scholar
  3. You just have to paint your nose in color and you will see how much it actually disturbs your field of vision or how much you have got used to this disturbance. You can now see that you have not seen what you have always seen.Google Scholar
  4. “There is no image or a sign in its place. One does not attribute a sign or image awareness to perception. " [Husserl 1980/79] Google Scholar
  5. What is meant here is the primal perception that is not the result of a critical attitude or a previous synthesis [cf. Merleau-Ponty 1966/282]. Google Scholar
  6. Luhmann, Morris [cf. 1934/18] Ciompi [cf. 1992 / 146ff., 173] and Willard van Orman Quine's thesis [cf. 1980 / 37ff.] Already indicated, “... that language seminars are not possible without non-linguistic reference to things in the outside world and therefore language can never completely construct reality out of itself” [Luhmann 1990/56]. It is also true for pictures that they will not sketch any conceptions of reality [thirdness] to an individual without experience of reality and deictic / indexing signs [secondity]. Google Scholar
  7. “Contingent is something that is neither necessary nor impossible; So what can be as it is (was, will be), but is also possible in other ways. The term therefore denotes what is given (what is experienced, expected, thought, fantasized) with regard to possible otherness; it denotes objects in the horizon of possible modifications. It presupposes the given world, so it does not designate what is possible in general, but what is otherwise possible from the perspective of reality. In this sense one has recently also spoken of the "possible world" of the one real world. The reality of this world is therefore presupposed in the concept of contingency as the first and indispensable condition of being possible. " [Luhmann 1987/152] be mental or social systems. We have to disregard their difference for the time being and therefore speak of »black boxes«. The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes get to do with each other, due to whatever coincidence. Each determines its own behavior through complex self-referential operations within its limits. That which becomes visible of it is therefore necessary reduction. Each assumes the same thing as the other. That is why the black boxes remain opaque to one another despite all the effort and all the time invested (they themselves are always faster!). ”[Luhmann 1987/156] Google Scholar
  8. Symbol (linguistic) meaning at Holzkamp does not reach the conceptual breadth of the previously mentioned sign meaning, because the symbol and the iconic symbol do not characterize all forms of object reference [cf. Holzkamp 1973/25 and 148]. Google Scholar
  9. Here I have to go to Cape 2.4. ‘Why is perception not a communication ... r anticipate by taking up information as a sensual event (psychic information acquisition) in contrast to the message as a communicative event [see p. 108]. Google Scholar
  10. S.S. 31 Consciousness is itself a third, since man reacts to objects in the sense of first, second and third. Google Scholar
  11. Even Luhmann tries to combine phenomenology with systems theory [cf. Luhmann 1987 / 153ff.] Google Scholar
  12. Cf. the language-analytical study by Ernst Tugendhat [cf. 1976 / 102f.], In which he shows through language analysis that “consciousness-of-something” is always based on the assumption that an existence sentence is true. Still, Tugendhat admits that this is not true of sign-like modes of consciousness. “But the consciousness can be conscious of the same object that is made present to it through the sign, even without the sign” [Tugendhat 1976/180] .Google Scholar
  13. As a cognitive element of the psychological system, I understand a non-specific, but organized system of transformations of earlier perceptions and experiences [cf. Neisser 1974 / 358ff.]. Google Scholar
  14. See also H. and B. Bayer, who assume, from a materialistic perspective, “... that all types of sensitivity depend on the practical activity in which they arose ...” [Bayer 1980 / 262f.]. Barbara B. Lloyd [cf. 1972/42] that in the language of the Zuni the colors yellow and orange are included in one category, and consequently no difference is perceived because the language does not offer this construction of reality.Google Scholar
  15. “There is probably an‘ embryonic meaning ’that is associated with an embryonic perception’ ”[Gibson 1973/305]. As a result, there are presumably unlearned meanings, but this “embryonic meaning” is not to be equated with a communicative sign meaning.Google Scholar
  16. Fellmann [cf. 1989/111] claims that when looking at fixed images, reflection takes place in a necessity. This supposed compulsion contradicts at least Indian meditation images, which, correctly used, should not lead to reflection. Walter Benjamin [cf. 1963/38] the experience of contemplating a picture without reflection. As a moment of aesthetic contemplation, Seel quite aptly describes the ruthless “... attention to something that is torn out of every conceivable practical and intellectual continuity by the way it is perceived” [Seel 1993/36] .Google Scholar
  17. In Peirce's sense, this would be an incorrect use of the term “semiotics”, because Peirce describes sensation and action / reaction as semiosis [see p. 42]. In Peirce's sense, this would be an incorrect use of the term “semiotics”, because Peirce describes sensation and action / reaction as semiosis [see p. 42]. Google Scholar
  18. The assignment of speech and image comprehension between the left and right hemispheres is probably too rough. Language and intuition can also be organized in a different way in himphysiologically. Nevertheless, brain research has so far assumed that images and language are processed in different modes or centers, which is what matters to me in that example.Google Scholar
  19. The idea of ​​simulation is not that new. Even Michelangelo tried to simulate the architecture on the ceiling in the Sistine Chapel as early as 1510. The ceiling fresco by Andrea Pozzo in the Roman “Sant’Ignazio di Loyola” church, painted around 1685, shows an even more impressive attempt to simulate the suspension between signs and room architecture.Google Scholar
  20. Today's cyberspace technology seems to be far from realistically stimulating pressure, warmth, smells, taste, i.e. all sensory fields of the entire body [cf. Waffender 1991]. Google Scholar
  21. Orally at the symposium “Interface II” on March 7th, 1993 in Hamburg on the question of what the difference between experience and signs is. Google Scholar
  22. Sartre [cf. 1971 / 68–71] describes this possibility of direct perception, in the separation of imagination and perception consciousness. For the moment of the trompe-l’oeil, Sartre establishes an awareness of perception in which a viewer becomes aware of such a perception as would also arise with the perception of a real person. In the perceptual consciousness, the picture speaks directly to the viewer. As soon as the picture is recognized as a sign, however, Sartre speaks of an imaginary consciousness in which the painting ceases to be an object, since it then becomes the matter of an "image" [("Eben", "mirror") picture, imagination ] acts. I think that Sartre's concepts of perceptual and imaginary consciousness are very similar to the distinction I have used between the consciousness of object and sign meaning, although I attribute perceptual consciousness mainly to the object image and not to the illusion of the eye. Google Scholar
  23. Etymologically, »seeing« means “following with your eyes” [Duden Etymologie 1989 Mannheim] .Google Scholar
  24. I want to stick with the terms of shape and color as I think they are easier to communicate. Although Gibson correctly insists that we do not receive any point-to-point correspondence of form on our retina, that is, no image. “The information that comes from an image to the observation site in the optical arrangement consists of variants, not shapes or colors” [Gibson 1982/313]. Accordingly, we see invariants [see p. 93], which we call shapes and colors, which should be considered in the following. Google Scholar
  25. The concept of similarity is still being problematized [see p. 316, chap. 2.11. “How does… similarity work?]. It should be said in advance that the similarity between image and referenced object is completely unnecessary for visual communication. In addition, pictures never resemble a referenced object completely, otherwise they would no longer be pictures. Images resemble their cultural code [cf. Schönrich 1990/138; Scholz 1991 / 43ff.]. Google Scholar
  26. The term “schemes” follows Neisser's theory [cf. 1979 / 48ff.] And will be explained in more detail [see p. 93]. Google Scholar
  27. The concept of the thought sign would be justified if one assumes, like Peirce, that every thought could be a “sign” which is reinterpreted by another thought, etc. Under this assumption, the difficulty would arise here, where the subject is, which generates and interprets the signs, since signs of a subject, as said with Ciompi (see page 74), are only the symptom of consciousness. If I agree with Peirce that we describe ourselves with seemingly symbolic conceptualizations, this does not mean that our brain structure is built up like character codes, because characters are only characters for what we describe by means of characters. Exclusively on the basis of special semiotic reconstruction achievements of the neurobiological Google Scholar
  28. This does not mean that the genetically determined visual abilities are not subject to a learning process, to which they can be optimized and for this reason belong in the realm of the visual system [cf. Neisser 1979/145]. According to Sutherland, the following eight skills are required as a prerequisite for visual experience; Neisser [cf. 1974/118] she calls “pre-attentive processes”: “1) The formation of unity and grouping, 2) The figure-ground relationship, 3) The descriptive continuation, 4) The movement, including the laws of induced movement, 5) The two-eyed Seeing depth, 6) The one-eyed depth of vision due to continuous image distortion, 7) The connection between approach and magnification, 8) The perception of the direction of sound ”[Sutherland 1970 quoted in Metzger 1975/658] .Google Scholar
  29. Sensitivity, and this is how the term should be defined in contrast to sensitization, says something about the possibility of specifically aligned receptors that absorb a certain form of stimulus energy that is effective at the receptor and registered by the brain as a sensation. Sensitivity “responds” to the properties of the optical world [cf. Bayer 1982/45]. Google Scholar
  30. The first form of irritability serves the requirement of metabolism [cf. Leontjew 1964 / 30f £]. Google Scholar
  31. This term structure is by no means to be confused with visual structures. The first characterizes processes of thinking with abstract signs, whereas the second grasps visual structuring as the process of seeing forms.Google Scholar
  32. It is noticeable that the duck's head is often seen first, which may have something to do with the culture-related direction of writing from left to right or perhaps only with the rabbit's ears that are too deep and too narrow. One could also agree with Ernst Pöppel [cf. 1982 / 143ff.], Who traces a preference for the left in pictures with a strongly emotional character back to the activity of the emotionally oriented right hemisphere, which is addressed when looking to the left. Google Scholar
  33. According to Goepper's investigations, Chinese painting basically does not try to achieve a “lifelike” representation, which is expressed in the following quote from Su Tung-p’o (1036–1101). “Anyone who judges images based on the similarity of the forms, their view is related to that of a child” [quoted from Goepper 1962/12] .Google Scholar
  34. Perception and sensory knowledge are synonymous in a sense. Unfortunately, the two terms cannot be reduced to a common denominator because the authors use the word perception in important terms such as perceptual system, although it could also be named as a system of sensory knowledge. Google Scholar
  35. It should also be noted that people who are completely color blind (achromatopsia / brain lesion) can no longer imagine any colors or recall them from the time before the disease [cf. Zeki 1992/59]. Google Scholar
  36. Regarding the pre-attentive processes [see p. 87 footnote 411Google Scholar
  37. Probably the most honest indicator of perceptual and expression phenomena in a culture is represented by the youth. In the newer fashion they hear techno-pop, which can hardly be surpassed, and move in stroboscopic “slow motion” .Google Scholar
  38. Husserl also notes: ‘Perception? Let's be more specific. Recurring, it is under no circumstances individually the same. Only the table is the same, as an identical consciousness in the synthetic consciousness that links the new perception with the memory ”[Husserl 1980/74] .Google Scholar
  39. Interaction should be understood to mean mutually oriented behavior of individuals. In Schütz's work, the term “social effective relationship” takes up an interaction in which individuals are intertwined in larger contexts [cf. Contactor 1971a / 25; Sommerfeld 1980/221]. Google Scholar
  40. It seems a bit contradictory to equate “second order” and “double contingency” in the same breath. Nevertheless, it is justified if one considers that communication as well as perception draw their own constructions of reality from one possibility. Communication creates a second order from the possibilities of perceived reality, and perception creates a first order and thus reality from the possibilities of sensations [see p. 62 footnote 20 (contingency)]. Google Scholar
  41. Based on the term “presentation code” from Kanngießer / Kriz [cf. 1983/93]. Google Scholar
  42. This direct communication in the relationship aspect is formulated by Oeser and Seitelberger [cf. 1988/163] as “’ pure ’communication” that integrates consciousness without symbolic representation. Because through “subtle influences” [Watzlawick 1978/47] in the relationship aspect “… something becomes possible that is independent of the original communication function between individuals, namely: the internal manipulation with linguistic symbols in thinking, which Plato already calls 'quiet speaking' has ”[Oeser and Seitelberger 1988/163, cf. Scherer 1979 / 25ff.]. Nöth [cf. 1985/191], Müller and Sottong [cf. 1993 / 34f.]. They do not want to understand the interpretation of signs (e.g. the index of an alcoholic's red nose) as a communicative and semiotic sign, because a "natural" sign remains without a voluntary "sender" and without choice.For pictures, however, it is necessary to understand perceptual actions in relation to colors and forms not as communication, but rather the pragmatic interpretation of any form as a sign as communication insofar as this is interpreted as such by the viewer, although the addressee may not understand some of his expressions and possibilities as Intended sign [see p 95, 125 (acting)]. Google Scholar
  43. So far, for example, video conferences and videophones are still the exception and only serve the primary dialogue by means of speech to a subordinate extent.Google Scholar
  44. The term “consensual area” in Maturana [cf. 1991/108; Roth 1991a / 261, 274] in this useful interpretation an area of ​​“structural coupling” [see p. 94] of perceptual structures of several individuals with their communication medium.Google Scholar
  45. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of gestalt psychology and brain physiology, one cannot speak of a repertoire of symbols. It is likely that concise structures rather than real elements persist in psychological memory. This resonates with the term “repertoire”. Knowing "something" understood, but as a picture object it is nevertheless a sign which already indicates that a picture will be seen. But precisely because nothing conceptually comprehensible is represented, concrete painting refers to the non-conceptual image experience that is common to all images.Google Scholar
  46. In various cases, art historians, archaeologists and ethnologists are occupied with understanding things as signs that were not intended as signs by the manufacturer of the object. For example, when historical dates or indications of social relationships are derived from individual nails, canvases and other material properties. Google Scholar
  47. Because of this, dreams or imaginations sometimes seem very real. Theater sets also maintain the difference to the auditorium, as long as they don't bring the visitors into the game themselves. Google Scholar
  48. Ernst Pöppel [cf. 1982 / 164f .; 1985 / 51ff.], Based on his research, is of the opinion that music, poems or picture sequences are subject to an upper time interval of 2-3 seconds in order to be processed by the human brain as a single meaning. Certainly, human communication is subject to the brain's processing speed in lower and upper intervals for a single meaning.Google Scholar
  49. If the tablets with ink blots in the Rohrschach test weren't very ambiguous, then nothing would come out of the viewer's subjective personality structure. Google Scholar
  50. Peirce writes: “Perhaps every rheme [rhema] can convey some information [messages], but it is not interpreted that way” [Peirce 1983/125] .Google Scholar
  51. In order to create a shift in interpretation within the art “world”, the artists Elaine Sturtevant and Cindy Sherman play with reproductions of well-known works of art.Google Scholar
  52. I have to contradict the terminology used by linguists who want to use "monosemantic" to describe the meaning of a sign. How linguists want to justify conclusively that, for example, the conceptual symbol "car" has only one meaning, seems to me unreasonable. At best, the meaning of "car" must be conceded that it shrinks to a few meanings in pragmatic contexts, although its symbolic designation can denote many different cars, that is, it is polysemantic.Google Scholar
  53. There is a certain joke in it when Morris conditions a dog to a food sign, but after a while no longer provides the denotation “food” and then denies the denotation signaled even though the dog denotes the denotation, the meaning of the indexical symbol, still remembered.Google Scholar
  54. This from Saussure [cf. The semiological distinction introduced in 1931/78] remains difficult to circumvent due to Eco's use and the desired signification code. With the proviso that a picture shows itself as a sign of its function, Schönrich can say for the normal sign relation to the object: “The signifier clearly describes the relation to the means of sign, the signified the relation to the object. Saussure reserves the expression "zeichen (signe) "" [Schönrich 1990/287] to convey both moments from the point of view of thirdness. According to Nöth [cf. 1985/65] this remains controversial because the Saussure dyad then became a triad, which would suggest that the Peirce triad should be understood as a tetrad of signs, representative names, object and interpreter. Google Scholar
  55. Eco writes "signification system" here. Although codes support systems, they themselves rarely run in the functional expectations of a social system. Social systems can also handle uncoded communication.Google Scholar
  56. Here I would like to anticipate Bense, who thinks of Eco's concept of "cultural unity" and "Barthes’ structuralist transcending of the concept of sign ... [criticizes] that these authors constantly confuse semiotics with hermeneutics "[Bense 1979/17]. This criticism is correct, but Bense would have to put up with the question of what his semiotics contains besides the operationalized classifications of his theory circle.Google Scholar
  57. An excellent example of this are 3-D images visible without glasses [cf. Baccei 1994]. Google Scholar
  58. In contrast to the final procedure of deduction and induction, Peirce names the final procedure of “abduction” as a hypothesis of the following kind: “rule. - All the beans in this sack are white. Result. - These beans are white ... Case. - These beans are out of this sack ”[Peirce 1967 1/367] .Google Scholar
  59. The disorder in Peirce's work was followed by an inadequate reception, which conjured up a monumental swamp, which consists in the fact that many authors were still able to understand the object references (icon, index, symbol), but then treated these object references as complete symbols without reference to signs or interpretants. This scientifically traditional confusion ultimately resulted in Scholz's image theory, which was based on Goodman, with the “… impression… that from the triad icon - index - symbol only the distinction between index and symbol remains…” [Scholz 1991/150] .Google Scholar
  60. Metz also wrote that cinema was a “language without language” [Metz 1972/95] in the sense of Saussure's langage (human speech / expression) without langue (conventional language) .Google Scholar
  61. Reckt writes: Even Plato broke away from the idea, "... according to which mimesis or imitation of nature ... would be fixed on the exact depiction of the" front of things "" [Recki 1991/118] .Google Scholar
  62. For the image propaganda of domination see Belting [cf. 1990/23] and - despite some semiotic fallacies - Hoffmann [cf. 1982 / 258ff.]. Google Scholar
  63. What A. Assmann erroneously calls the “language of things” [Assmann 1988a / 244] occurs only where “things” are promised, such as “the cunning of the fox”. Google Scholar
  64. This semioticization of forms is described by Luhmann [cf. 1990a / 14; 1987/230, 112; 1986a / 8f.] And Baecker [cf. 1990 / 68f., 89] every time they are used in the formulation of Spencer Brown [cf. 1972 / 70ff.] Insist that the inside of a first form is observed via a distinguishable invariance. With this first distinction, it becomes possible in character codings of third parties to designate that inner side of the form, to include it as a sign for a function or to have it figured as a designation (in re-entry) for something else. What remains unspoken is that in addition to the perceptual construction of form differences, form-like surfaces are also perceived, which - filled with color qualities - provoke aesthetic emotions without any further distinction. At the beginning of every identity there is difference, but this can only be realized if difference-free firstness (e.g. in the light intensity or in undifferentiated or undecidable emotionality) is perceived as a condition for further possibilities.Google Scholar
  65. Husserl says: 'Reality and world are here titles for certain valid units of sense, namely units of' sense ', related to certain connections of absolute, pure consciousness that are essentially so and not otherwise meaningful and valid' [Husserl 1980 / 106 §55]. For Husserl, "titles for sensory perceptions" are fundamentally not identical with the remembered meanings in the lifeworld, because the "non-memorable ... can only be" lived "but in no way" thought "; it is essentially inarticulate ”[Schütz 1974170] .Google Scholar
  66. Eco [cf. 1991/269] specifies that the everyday mirror image of "something" is not a sign because it cannot be used to lie. Likewise, different character encodings are a reflection of conceptualized thinking habits, which as cultural forms are neither true nor false. For example, language as the meaning-constituting character coding of worldviews is not itself a lie. It may be that a character coding cannot, for example, reflect musical thinking habits, but that would not be a lie, but affects the efficiency of the character coding itself. Google Scholar
  67. There are, of course, exceptions, for example Sigmar Polke left large picture areas unpainted on a canvas made of gauze for the pictures “White Cloud” [1992] and “Haus vom Nikolaus” [1992], which makes the stretcher frames and the wall behind the pictures visible Google Scholar
  68. With this remark, both Luhmann's theory and this work avoid understanding meaning as a sign and designation for itself. However, according to Peirce, the only sense that is not a sign occurs in the change in the habit of thinking from, for example, feeling to thinking. According to Karger [cf. 1986/42] every change in the habit of thinking already leads to a sign. This would mean, however, that every change in meaning appears as a sign and is then necessarily itself a sign of the transition to other contexts of meaning. This sign should therefore be an indexical sign. The non-fulfillment of the function of the sign, which arises when meaning is taken as a sign for itself, then indicates that a change in the context of meaning or the habit of thinking has not yet taken place, but this is only noticed when the change has taken place. Google Scholar
  69. Dürer developed his central perspective from a grid of threads, which was stretched in a frame, concretized the fixed view of an object and thus became calculable and translatable onto a grid of lines on the painting surface. Google Scholar
  70. However, Luhmann goes too far when he writes: “The term» consensus can only mean the state of consciousness of the environment of the social system, insofar as it functions as a medium for forms that are decided through communication ”[Luhmann 1992/56]. Images oppose it. They enable a consensual state of consciousness in which the environment is perceived, although this was first established through communication and the system, i.e. contain a (meaning) consensus within visual communication.Google Scholar
  71. "In the general [and traditional] terminology,‘ Consensus ’is equated with‘ Individual agreement ’. Two or more individuals independently refer to a common object of their perception, judgment, decision. The extent to which the individual members agree in their perceptions, assessments and decisions is called the extent of the consensus [Siegrist 1970/6]. With regard to this initial definition, Siegrist rightly criticizes the fact that a consensus in the forms of designation does not have to result in a consensus in the interpretations of meaning, since context messages are also relevant for the latter. He then comes to the following definition, which I agree with: "’ Consensus ’means the agreement reached between interaction partners due to reflexive co-orientation“ [Siegrist 1970/55].